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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
european court of Human 
rigHtS
Portugal’s limitations of advocates 
of abortion declared illegal
In Women on Waves and others v. Portu-
gal, the Court gave strong backing to free-
dom of expression and found a violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
in the very sensitive context of abortion. 
Generally, the Court has so far refrained 
from giving any clear answer to the ques-
tion whether there is a right to abortion 
under the Convention or on the contrary 
whether abortion is prohibited. Yet, the 
Court has been quite protective of freedom 
of speech of pro-choice advocates. In 1992 
in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman 
v. Ireland, the Court found that the Irish 
strict anti-abortion laws, which included 
an absolute ban on abortion counseling, 
violated the freedom of expression. The 
present case decided on February, 3, 2009 
follows this precedent.
A Dutch NGO, Women on Waves, oper-
ates a ship, which it sends to countries 
where abortion is illegal. The ship then 
sails into international waters where its 
medical personnel can legally undertake 
early abortions. In 2004 this ship intended 
to come to Portugal and stay in its ports to 
hold seminars and meetings on the topics 
of the prevention of sexually transmit-
ted diseases, family planning, and the 
decriminalization of abortion. The Portu-
guese authorities, however, prohibited the 
ship to enter its territorial waters because 
they claimed that it was to “distribute 
pharmaceutical products not authorized by 
the Portuguese health authorities” and to 
encourage “the practice of certain illegal 
acts.” The Portuguese government sent two 
warships to enforce the order and patrol the 
Dutch ship which remained in international 
waters.
Seven judges had no problem to find 
unanimously a violation of the freedom of 
expression. They acknowledged the illegal-
ity of abortion in Portugal and the values 
underlying it but stressed that freedom of 
expression has the greatest value precisely 
when its exercises “offend, shock and chal-
lenge the established order.” The Court 
found as unsubstantiated the government’s 
claim that illegal abortions were to be 
conducted on the ship once in Portuguese 
waters. Regarding the fear of distribution 
of unauthorized medicine, the Court held 
that other measures were available to the 
government (such as seizure of the pro-
hibited drugs) and that the outright ban on 
access for the ship to its waters was clearly 
disproportionate. Sending warships against 
a civilian ship, according to the court, not 
only negatively affected the rights of the 
Dutch NGO but also had a chilling effect 
on others wishing to exercise their freedom 
of speech. Similarly, the Court dismissed 
the government’s claim that the intended 
seminars could take place by stressing that 
it is not for the government to dictate how 
and where freedom of expression can be 
exercised. If Women on Waves wanted to 
hold the seminars on the ship, it was their 
right to do so.
The activities of Women on Waves 
were part of a broader campaign to legal-
ize abortion in Portugal. This aim was 
finally achieved in 2007 when abortion on 
demand until 12 weeks into pregnancy was 
made legal after a non-binding referendum 
to that effect.
States must take effective measures 
to prevent killings
A violation of the right to life was found 
by the Court in Branko Tomašic and Others 
v. Croatia. Croatia has failed to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent deaths of a mother 
and a child killed by the mother’s former 
partner and father of the child. The case, 
decided on January, 15, 2009, serves as a 
recapitulation of the positive obligations of 
states arising from the right to life in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
The existence of positive obligations 
under the right to life is well established 
in the Court’s case-law and as such is not 
disputed. States have an obligation first of 
all to have in place criminal law provisions 
to protect the right backed by effective 
“law-enforcement machinery for the pre-
vention, suppression and punishment of 
breaches of such provisions.” Moreover, 
in 1998 in the now classic case of Osman 
v. the United Kingdom, the Court ruled 
that if there exists a “real and immediate 
risk to the life of an identified individual” 
of which the authorities knew or should 
have known, they must take reasonable 
operational measures to prevent that risk 
from materializing. The application of this 
Osman test was an issue in this case.
After their separation, the father repeat-
edly threatened to kill the mother and 
the child. For that he was convicted of 
death threats and sentenced to five months 
imprisonment and was ordered to undergo 
a psychiatric treatment in the prison. The 
treatment was not, however, properly 
administered. Several weeks after serving 
his sentence the father went to the house of 
the mother and the child and shot both of 
them before shooting himself. The police 
were tipped off by a neighbor who saw 
the father approaching the house but they 
unfortunately arrived twenty minutes late.
In applying the Osman test the Court 
found that the authorities clearly knew 
of the danger posed by the father. These 
threats were real as evidenced by the fact 
that he was imprisoned for them. Yet, the 
Court found that Croatia failed to take any 
adequate measures to reduce the risk. The 
Court noticed that no search of the father’s 
house was conducted to find out if his 
claims that he possessed weapons to carry 
out the killings were true. Further, the Court 
stressed that the father was diagnosed in 
need for continued psychiatric treatment. 
Yet, his ordered psychiatric treatment was 
about to last only two months and even 
that short treatment was not conducted by 
qualified psychiatric professionals. More-
over, no psychiatric assessment was con-
ducted prior to his release. Consequently, 
the Court unanimously decided that the 
authorities failed “to take all necessary and 
reasonable steps” to protect the lives of the 
mother and the child and thus violated their 
right to life.
The case is a testament to the strong 
protection the Court affords to the right to 
life, which it describes as “one of the most 
fundamental provisions in the Convention.” 
Here, even though the father had been 
imprisoned for death threats and the police 
arrived at the scene as soon as possible, it 
was not enough to fulfill the states’ posi-
tive obligations arising from the right to 
life. Even though such obligations cannot 
put a “disproportionate burden on authori-
ties,” they must nevertheless be effective 
in protecting this fundamental right. Thus, 
the test of reasonability of measures the 
state must take to prevent killings is quite 
high. That seems to be fully justified in 
view of the finality of violations of the 
right to life.
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A Selection of Other Recent 
Significant Cases
In several cases the Court has been 
faced with the unfortunately ever perva-
sive question of torture and other inhuman 
treatment. In Atalay v. Turkey it found that 
the prohibition of ill-treatment is so fun-
damental that its violations must be ade-
quately criminally punished. Consequently 
the short suspended imprisonment of the 
responsible police officer and acquittal 
on appeal of two others fell short of the 
Convention’s standards and Turkey failed 
to fulfill its positive obligations under 
the prohibition of ill-treatment. In Ben 
Khemais v. Italy the Court found that dip-
lomatic assurances given by Tunisia, where 
the applicant was to be deported, could 
not be effective in view of the reports of 
persistent torture in Tunisian prisons. This 
judgment is another addition to the list of 
decisions that held that diplomatic assur-
ances in cases of torture cannot be deemed 
effective. Whether they can ever be thus 
becomes more and more questionable.
In A. and others v. the United Kingdom 
the Grand Chamber of the Court on Febru-
ary, 19, 2009 confirmed the 2004 holding 
of the House of Lords that the British post 
9/11 scheme of indefinite detention of 
non-British terrorist suspects was discrimi-
natory and violated their right to liberty. 
At the same time, though, it found that the 
scheme did not per se constitute inhuman 
treatment.
In Olujic v. Croatia the Court reminded 
judges that they cannot publicly express 
their opinions about a case or a party to a 
case that they are about to decide. If they 
do so they compromise their impartiality 
in violation of the right to a fair trial of 
the parties to the case. On the other hand 
judges have the right to comment on the 
internal affairs in the judiciary. In Kudesh-
kina v. Russia a judge was dismissed 
because of disseminating deceptive and 
insulting perceptions of the judicial system 
after publicly questioning the indepen-
dence of the Moscow judiciary. The Court 
found this to be an illegal interference with 
her freedom of expression.
A question of whether a disproportion-
ate punishment can violate the European 
Convention on Human rights was con-
sidered by the Court in the similar cases 
of Ismayilov v. Russia and Grifhorst v. 
France. In both cases the complainants 
were convicted of not declaring the carry-
ing of large amounts of lawfully acquired 
foreign currency when crossing the border. 
They were sentenced to a suspended term 
of imprisonment and a fine respectively 
and their money was confiscated. In both 
cases the Court found a violation of their 
right to property because the confiscations 
taken together with the other penalties 
were disproportionate and thus could not 
be considered a proportionate interference 
with their property.
In the largely identical cases of 
Armoniene v. Lithuania and Biriuk v. Lithu-
ania the Court delved into the issue of 
insufficiency of damages for violations 
of privacy awarded under national laws. It 
found that the statutory limit on the amount 
of damages which results in low awarded 
damages disproportionate to the serious-
ness of the breach fall short of the positive 
obligations of states to effectively protect 
the right to privacy of its inhabitants. The 
principal reason was that the limit dimin-
ishes the deterrent effect of the prohibition 
on infringements of privacy.
In Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia the 
Grand Chamber unified the Court’s diverse 
interpretation of the non bis in idem rule. 
It unanimously ruled that a second pros-
ecution is prohibited if it arises from 
identical or substantially the same facts 
irrespective of their possible different legal 
classification.
inter-american SyStem
IACHR Demands State 
Responsibility for Forced 
Disappearances in Ticona Estrada et 
al. v. Bolivia
In its November 27, 2008 judgment in 
the case of Ticona Estrada et al. v Bolivia, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Court) found Bolivia liable for the forced 
disappearance of Renato Ticona Estrada. 
The judgment marked the Court’s commit-
ment to combating impunity and to guar-
anteeing adequate reparations for victims 
of human rights violations.
Bolivia came before the Inter-American 
system to address allegations by Estrada’s 
family members that the state had violated 
the human rights of Estrada, his brother, 
Hugo, and their family members. Renato 
disappeared on July 22, 1980, when he 
and his brother were randomly detained 
by military officers and tortured. While 
the military officials transferred Hugo to 
medical facilities following this treatment, 
they handed Renato over to the Division of 
Public Order, and he was never seen again. 
This disappearance occurred amidst a pat-
tern of repression and systematic human 
rights abuses by the Bolivian military and 
paramilitary groups, which came to power 
through a coup d’état in 1980.
Bolivia responded to the alleged viola-
tions brought by the victim’s family mem-
bers and the Inter-American Commission 
for Human Rights (Commission) by issu-
ing a partial acknowledgment of its respon-
sibility. In particular, Bolivia recognized 
its international responsibility for violating 
Renato Ticona Estrada’s right to juridical 
personality (Article 3), right to life (Article 
4), right to humane treatment (Article 5), 
right to personal liberty (Article 7), right to 
a fair trial (Article 8) and right to judicial 
protection (Article 5) as enshrined in the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention). In addition, the state recog-
nized its responsibility for various provi-
sions of the Inter-American Convention 
on the Forced Disappearance of Persons 
(IACFDP) and a series of provisions of 
the American Convention relating to the 
family members, including Hugo Ticona 
Estrada. The state’s representative formally 
apologized for these violations. Despite 
this partial acknowledgement, however, 
Bolivia contested the reparations requested 
by the family members and the Commis-
sion, the alleged violations of Hugo Ticona 
Estrada’s due process rights (Articles 8 and 
25), and the violation of the IACFDP in 
relation to Renato. Bolivia challenged the 
reported failure to adopt domestic legal 
provisions in accordance with the Conven-
tion (Article 2).
The Court found that the state failed to 
comply with its obligations under Article 2 
to adopt sufficient domestic provisions in 
relation to forced disappearances. Specifi-
cally, Bolivia failed to define the crime of 
forced disappearance in its domestic laws, 
as required, until after the immediate case 
was brought before the Inter-American 
system. Although the violation had since 
been rectified with the incorporation of 
this crime into Bolivian law in 2006, the 
Court held the state responsible for this 
violation. The Court also found Bolivia 
responsible for the due process violations 
suffered by Hugo Ticona Estrada insofar as 
the state had failed to investigate his claims 
of torture, to punish those responsible, and 
to provide full reparation.
On the issue of the IACFDP, the Court 
found in Bolivia’s favor, noting that the 
offense of forced disappearance does not 
include a duty to hold detainees in a recog-
nized place of detention because detention 
does not share the same continuity over 
time as does the forced disappearance. 
Interestingly, although Bolivia had con-
ceded responsibility for violating Renato 
Ticona Estrada’s right to juridical personal-
ity enshrined in Article 3, the Court found 
that no such violation had been committed 
because the specific meaning of that right, 
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that every person should be recognized 
as having rights and obligations, was not 
infringed in this case.
The Court prescribed extensive repara-
tions, including pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary damages and took into consideration 
the lost income of Renato Ticona Estrada 
based on his life expectancy. The Court 
directed Bolivia to expeditiously continue 
criminal proceedings in relation to this 
case, and to conduct a thorough and prompt 
investigation into the matter.
Court finds Arbitrary Detention 
Violations in Bayarri v. Argentina
On October 30, 2008, the Court issued 
its judgment in the case of Bayarri v. 
Argentina, holding that the unlawful and 
arbitrary detention of Juan Carlos Bayarri 
for thirteen years constituted a violation of 
the right to humane treatment (Article 5), 
the right to personal liberty (Article 7), the 
right to a fair trial (Article 8) and the right 
to judicial protection (Article 25) of the 
Convention.
Argentina contested the admissibility of 
the case before the Court based on Bayar-
ri’s alleged failure to exhaust domestic 
remedies. Although it had not challenged 
the admissibility of the case before the 
Commission, Argentina alleged that the 
state had since offerred a domestic remedy 
for Bayarri. The Court held that the pos-
sibility of a new domestic remedy did not 
create another procedural opportunity for 
a state to question the admissibility of the 
petition; admissibility is established the 
moment a petition is filed before the Com-
mission, and at that time, Bayarri had no 
effective domestic remedy available.
Substantively, the Court held that 
Argentina had violated the Article 5 right 
to humane treatment by subjecting Bayarri 
to various forms of torture. The Court 
found that Argentina had tacitly accepted 
the legal determinations by its own domes-
tic courts, which concluded in 2004 and 
2005, respectively, that Bayarri’s confes-
sion had been coerced through torture and 
that proceedings against him did not meet 
domestic standards of due process. In addi-
tion, the Court noted that Argentina failed 
to investigate Bayarri’s physical and mental 
suffering with due diligence.
The Court also found a violation of Arti-
cle 7 insofar as Bayarri had experienced 
unlawful detention. In 2005, a domestic 
court confirmed that Bayarri had been 
detained without an arrest warrant and had 
been held at a clandestine facility. He was 
not promptly brought before a judge and 
was held in preventive detention for thir-
teen years, a time period well beyond that 
permissible under domestic law.
Further, the Court determined that 
Argentina violated Articles 8 and 25, which 
guarantee a fair trial and judicial protec-
tion, respectively. The Court observed that 
it took fourteen years for domestic courts 
to conclude an investigation of the facts 
in this case. The first judgment against 
Bayarri was handed down ten years after 
his detention, and the final judgment of 
acquittal was not issued until 2004. These 
delays constituted a violation of Article 8. 
Further, because Argentina’s ineffective 
investigation made it impossible to clarify 
the facts and to determine alleged criminal 
responsibility, the state violated the Article 
25 right to judicial protection.
Because the Commission had not previ-
ously deemed the family members victims, 
the Court only considered Bayarri in its 
reparations analysis. The Court prescribed 
pecuniary damages for medical and psy-
chological treatment and for future care, 
as well as for lost earnings. In addition, 
the Court mandated that Argentina must 
conclude the criminal case against Bayarri 
and ensure procedural protections in that 
process.
Court Protects Lawyer’s Rights  
to Privacy
The Court issued a judgment in the case 
of Tristan Donoso v. Panama on January 
27, 2009, holding that Panama violated 
various rights of Panamanian lawyer San-
tander Tristan Donoso in relation to the 
recording and dissemination of a phone 
conversation between Donoso and a client. 
Based on the contents of this conversa-
tion, which pertained to suspicious con-
tributions to the political campaign of the 
then-attorney general, the attorney general 
initiated defamation proceedings against 
Donoso, which culminated in a conviction 
in 2004. Donoso and his representatives 
subsequently petitioned in the Inter-Amer-
ican system for relief.
The Court analyzed the alleged viola-
tions of Donoso’s human rights, including 
the right to privacy (Article 11), freedom 
of thought and expression (Article 13), the 
right to a fair trial (Article 8), and judicial 
protection (Article 25). The Court found 
violations of some part of each of the 
articles alleged.
In determining whether there had been a 
violation of Article 11, the Court observed 
that the right to privacy is not absolute, but 
rather must be protected from arbitrary and 
abusive interferences. Because there was 
no proof that the attorney general or any 
other state actor had ordered or facilitated 
the infringement on Donoso’s privacy, the 
Court could not find that Panama had 
violated Article 11 with the recording. The 
Court then considered the dissemination of 
the conversation to members of the press 
and the church. The Court found that while 
the state did have an interest in prevent-
ing potential defamation of its officials, 
the attorney general’s actions in leaking 
the recorded conversation to these parties 
was an inappropriate strategy for pursuing 
this interest. Additionally, the inflamma-
tory language used by the attorney general 
when he presented the recorded conversa-
tion to the church and others damaged 
Donoso’s honor and reputation, both of 
which are protected under Article 11. On 
these grounds, the Court held that Panama 
had violated Donoso’s right to privacy.
Regarding the alleged violation of Arti-
cle 13, freedom of thought and expression, 
the Court concluded that Donoso reason-
ably believed that the campaign involved 
corrupt business practices. Thus, the Court 
held that the criminal sanction imposed 
against Donoso was manifestly unneces-
sary and violated his right to freedom of 
expression.
Because Panama had conducted a dili-
gent investigation in the matter against 
Donoso, it did not violate its due process 
obligations pursuant to Article 25. The 
Court did hold, however, that because the 
conviction against Donoso was based only 
on an illegally-obtained tape, his convic-
tion could not stand and his right to a fair 
trial under Article 8 had been violated.
The Court called for a series of pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary damages as repara-
tion for Donoso. Additionally, it mandated 
that Panama invalidate Donoso’s criminal 
conviction.  HRB
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